Sunni-Led Regime Deepens Sectarian 'Cold Wars' in Post-Assad Syria
Since the fall of the Assad government on December 8, 2024, the Sunni Islamist administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa has moved to consolidate control, most notably by dismantling the K...
Since the fall of the Assad government on December 8, 2024, the Sunni Islamist administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa has moved to consolidate control, most notably by dismantling the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in the northeast in January 2026. Syria has not unified; instead a series of localized sectarian confrontations has unfolded. Four major episodes of ethno-sectarian violence since late 2024 have included mass killings of Alawites on the western coast (Feb–Mar 2025), targeted attacks on Druze communities culminating in a large July 2025 massacre in Sweida that contributed to roughly 1,700 deaths and prompted an Israeli air intervention, and clashes between government forces and Kurdish/SDF units in January 2026 after U.S. forces withdrew support.
Minorities and geopolitics
The Druze (≈4% of the population) have maintained a de facto enclave around Sweida under an informal Israeli guarantee, where pro-Israel demonstrations and strong separatist currents exist alongside pro-Damascus and intermediate factions led by figures such as Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou and Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinnawi. Alawite communities (≈12%) have so far failed to mount a unified response; communal organization includes the Alawite Supreme Council and armed networks of former regime officers like the Syrian Popular Resistance (Miqdad Fatiha) and the Military Council to Free Syria (Ghaith Dala), but these remain a latent threat. Kurdish areas (≈10%) face coerced reintegration: many SDF fighters have been folded into state security forces, with only about 8,000 remaining outside government structures and local autonomy sharply curtailed. Outside support is limited — Israel backs the Druze enclave, the U.S. abandoned the Kurds in early 2026, and Iran is not heavily intervening on behalf of Alawites — leaving minority communities vulnerable as the Sharaa government, backed in part by influential U.S. interlocutors aligned with Turkish and Qatari interests, leans on Sunni Islamist and jihadi militias as instruments of policy. as reported by Jerusalem Post